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The apparent discontinuity of Jewish literary tradition between the texts of the 
Tanakh and the Talmud seems to mark more than a switch in genres or 
thematic concerns. It would seem to be a radical shift or transformation of 
national imagination, if we dare such a sweeping generalization. The Tanakh 
consists of three main sections – Torah, Nevi’im, and Ketuvim, that is, the 
Pentateuch, the Major Prophets, and the Miscellany of Hagiographical 
Writings. For the most part, these biblical books can be divided into lengthy 
and continuous narrations, whether sagas of families, national histories and 
chronicles, and exemplary or allegorical stories; formally structured poems, 
such psalms, hymns, laments, and love songs; and harangues, sermons, and 
more or less discontinuous proverbs, sayings and attributed or unattributed 
expostulations on moral and spiritual themes. Their thematic concerns are 
associated with the mythical history of the human race, the national 
development of Israel as a Holy People, and the moral dilemmas of political 
crisis, exile, and relationships with God within the covenantal code, the Law. 
After a gap of several centuries – albeit a period in which, as we shall 
only briefly note, a variety of other narratives, lyrical collections, and homiletic 
genres appeared outside the canonical collection – a different form of discourse 
becomes dominant and gradually accumulates its own canonicity, relative 
stability, and imaginative approach to key issues of Jewish life. These books 
can be generally called rabbinical or talmudic, and consist of Mishnah (along 
with the supplementary Tosafist writings), Gamorah, which when published in 
conjunction with the Mishnah that they comment on is known as Talmud, 
albeit their two main collections, a Yerushalmi (or Jerusalem) Talmud for the 
Land of Israel and a Bavli (or Babylonian) Talmud for the Lands of Exile, and 
a series of what Jacob Neusner calls the successor books, including Midrashim 
or exegetical and poetic elaborations on Scripture and other separate 
collections of halachic (legal) and aggadic (homiletic and non-legal) 
commentary on biblical texts. These rabbinical books are characterized by 
features such as brief and seemingly disconnected anecdotal narratives, short 
comments and conversations or debates on thematic issues, and, as a 
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consequence, an almost total lack of narrative coherence, consistency, and 
development, on the one hand, and an analogous near-complete lack of logical 
coherence and development in regard to thematic exposition.1 To an outsider, 
unfamiliar with both the inner dynamic of rabbinic dialogism and with the 
rhetorical strategies and techniques of wit and allusiveness, this second range 
of Jewish discourses seems without order, consistency or unity of purpose. In 
addition, the rabbinical books have an appearance of having shifted away from 
matters of national or even universal import to those of a strictly local, 
parochial, or provincial significance, and thereby to lack moral resonance 
outside of the Jewish world – and even then to float in a non-historical, non-
political and unimportant sea of petty squabbling and quibbling. 
However, these generalisations, once set out in this bald way, fall apart 
almost immediately as unviable and untrue for many reasons. Not least of these 
reasons may be that close attention to the Tanakh shows that it contains many 
aspects of later rabbinical writings already functioning within itself, so that we 
can characterize it as being engaged in a rabbinical commentary upon itself 
long before rabbis and their central institutions of scholarship and legislation 
came into being. In addition, though the later books sometimes seem to be 
grotesque extensions of the least narrative parts of the Five Books of Moses, 
particularly the last three books with their exposition of the Law handed down 
at Mounts Sinai and Horeb and expounded further by Moses, Aaron and other 
elders in the Tent of Meeting, have a witty, personal and philosophical 
keenness not really evident in the biblical texts. In fact, once we are alerted to 
these three features – wit, personality and philosophy – it is possible to begin to 
find a subtle sequence of red threads binding together the otherwise apparent 
gallimaufry and confusion of trivia that constitutes the so-called Sea of 
Talmud. 
More than that, I am now going to argue, at least in a preliminary way 
and in the footsteps of one branch of modern scholarship, that this shift in the 
imagination of Hebrew civilization from Tanakh to Talmud is also a shift from 
Middle Eastern to Mediterranean, that is, classical Greek and Roman (or 
Hellenistic) civilization. Such a shift, which is also a transformation, is not a 
replacement of one by the other, but rather a recasting of the traditional ancient 
materials in a form that is motivated by the need to respond to new 
circumstances, challenges, and crises that cannot otherwise be endured. In each 
instance, when Israel is faced with a set of events that force it to leave its 
                                                             
1 See Jeffrey L. Rubinstein, Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition and Culture 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) for an examination of Talmudic 
narrative techniques. Also see the collection of essays edited by Carol Bakhos, Current 
Trends in the Study of Midrash (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2006). 
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position of relative stability and harmony, either by destruction of its 
institutions, expulsion from the lands where its laws and customs are operative, 
or undermining of its educational and intellectual foundations, Judaism has 
created new – and sometimes, new kinds of – discourses to attempt to stabilize, 
fill in gaps, or re-envision the situation mythically, morally and juridically. 
 
Classical Connections 
This article cannot do more than touch on a few minor areas of this 
overwhelming series of shifts and metamorphoses in Jewish history. What 
follows is at once, then, an introductory foray, a synthesis of some recent 
insights by major scholars, and a few exemplary readings of texts to show how 
and where the changes are occurring in the rabbinical books. One of the 
foremost Israeli folklorists and commentators on ancient popular traditions, 
Dov Noy, wrote a quarter of a century ago: 
The Talmudic-Midrashic A[g]gada, unlike the philosophical works 
of Greece, does not formulate problems in abstract terms, but the 
problems are evident in the story and the narrative plot. The acting 
characters of the story, or the sages discussing it, often manifest 
various philosophical attitudes.2 
From this brief statement we may extrapolate several key points to be 
discussed here: there is a relationship between rabbinical writings of the rabbis 
in the formative age of Judaism and the philosophers and rhetorical theorists of 
classical Greece and Rome. While these different cultural groups use different 
techniques to argue their cases, they are nevertheless engaged in similar 
enterprises common to the Mediterranean world of Late Antiquity. 
The rabbinical mode of argumentation, though it appears radically 
different in style to that of the ancient pagan philosophers, nevertheless 
resembles the other sufficiently to be seen as concerned with questions of 
epistemology, moral discernment and application, discussions of social and 
political justice, and similar topics specific to the classical concerns of 
philosophy. The aggadah therefore has to be approached in ways that seem 
more familiar to literary analysis than to philosophical discussion, but still will 
reveal in due course essential thematic concerns, which go beyond the normal 
boundaries of literary criticism and enter those of philosophy proper. 
By coupling together both Talmudic and Midrashic narrative modes, 
Dov Noy also alerts us to a shared enterprise in both of these rabbinical kinds 
                                                             
2 Dov Noy, ‘The Jewish Theodicy Legend’, in Fields of Offering: Studies in Honor of 
Raphael Patai, ed. Victor D. Sanua (Rutherford, Madison, Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press and London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, A Herzl Press 
Publication, 1983), pp. 66-67. 
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of exegesis and enhancement of texts that requires for understanding an 
appreciation of how Jews see the various texts that came into being in the eight 
hundred years or so between the close of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and the 
close of the two major talmudic collections, the Yerushalmi (The Talmud of 
Jerusalem or the Land of Israel) and the Bavli (The Talmud of Babylonia or the 
Lands of Dispersion): between them come the Mishnah, Tosafot, and a series 
of “the successor books”, not least of which are the Midrashim. Though each 
of these separate documents comes into being because the authors, compilers, 
and redactors felt compelled by particular circumstances – or more accurately, 
crises – that beset the Holy People of Israel, the cumulative result has been, 
precisely because the persons involved in the enterprise shared basic attitudes 
and rhetorical techniques, a unified, mutually-enlightening body of rabbinical 
discourse. The attitudes shared focus on the importance of written texts as the 
medium of both revelation and analysis of that revelation. The techniques 
shared centre on oblique, witty, and dialogic modes of discussion, debate and 
amplification of the principles contained within that ongoing revelation, at 
once an originary moment of reception of a written text (Tablets of the Law or 
Torah scrolls) and a simultaneous, dynamic and continuing production of an 
oral text (Torah al-peh). While the Written Torah is contextualized by Israel as 
a Middle Eastern civilization in the Ancient World and hence shares many of 
its own attitudes and strategies of application with other contemporaneous or 
precedent civilizations, although always with a radically critical distinction, the 
Oral Torah grows and develops within a larger, Mediterranean culture shared 
particularly with what emerges as Hellenistic civilization. 
 
Inadvertence and Implication 
Dov Noy argues that in rabbinical writing it is the inadvertent implication, 
“talking unawares”,3 that is picked out for most careful scrutiny and discussion. 
Rabbis aver that the most trustworthy evidence in a trial is that from a witness 
who speaks naively, without consideration of the impact or implications of 
what he or she is saying at that point. Noy sums up the rabbinical decision 
neatly: “The Halakha accepts as trust-worthy the testimony of a witness who 
tells of an event in this manner, without being asked and without being aware 
of the possible legal implications”. 4 This unforeseen implication, when 
utilized by commentators in their reading of sacred books, goes beyond the 
intentions, intelligence or awareness of the speaker or actor, as well as the 
original writer or commentator, and hence may illuminate passages elsewhere 
                                                             
3 Noy, ‘The Jewish Theodicy Legend’, p. 66. 
4 Noy, ‘The Jewish Theodicy Legend’, p. 66. The reference Noy makes here is to Bavli, 
Yebamot 121b. 
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in the same text that were supposedly conceived in a different light altogether 
or in other books not yet compiled or edited. For the detail picked out may be 
credited less to the naïve speaker or the person passing on a tradition in the 
name of authoritative predecessors and more to the glimpse this detail gives in 
to a situation otherwise occluded or totally closed off from inspection by prior 
concerns. 
Akin in part to certain aspects of irony as structured into the 
philosophical, dramatic and narrative classical works of ancient Greece and 
Rome, this rabbinic stress on the inadvertency of detail – sometimes, an 
apparent error in spelling or grammar by a scribal copyist – goes further than 
the normal range of implications allowed to irony. There are several reasons 
and dimensions to this witty discursive ploy of supposed inadvertency. As in 
the most subtle word-play, allusions and patterns of thematic relationship to be 
found in Homer, Apuleius or other classical authors, the rabbis inject into their 
own exegesis of sacred texts a sense of an orderly purpose that belies the 
chaotic or anarchic nature of history when experienced outside the conscious 
realization of God’s controlling justice. 
In the writings of the Greeks and Romans, these deflections to the 
eccentric and the trivial signal the generic force of comedy and satire. These 
genres rise out of and then develop through the Cynical schools of thought, 
wherein a model of applied morality and ethics undermines the suspected 
motives of sophistical learning, that is, modes of knowledge. On the one hand 
these can be taught to anyone for a price and to prepare the practitioners to 
function within established social institutions; and, on the other hand, to fissure 
the certainties of supposedly abstract, objective processes of thought. In both 
cases, the Cynics seek to expose hypocrisy, materialistic goals, and 
Machiavellian principles – those willing to argue either side of a case and 
adopt or adapt any position for the sake expediency, self-aggrandizement, or 
political influence. The line from the Cynics to the rabbis runs through figures 
such as Socrates and Apuleius, with some peripheral guidance from both 
Epicureans and Stoics, as well as a number of secular authors who are cited 
usually more indirectly than directly in talmudic discourse. Word-play, in brief, 
manipulates words in order to destabilize conventional structures of 
epistemology and open spaces for Jewish insights and experiences.5 
In reaction against the polytheistic, idol-worshipping import assumed to 
underlie all pagan writings, the rabbis seek to reveal a transcendent, timeless 
unity of purpose and meaningfulness that is at the same time dynamic, 
continuous, and shockingly surprising. The truth and ethical principles of the 
                                                             
5 Richard Parry, ‘Ancient Ethical Theory’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009), at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-ancient/, accessed 28/12/09. 
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Law exist in a kind of cybernetic accord with the free will of individual 
persons, the shifting waves of political and social history, and the tremendous 
and extensive diversity of the natural universe. They do this, however, by 
diverting philosophical discussions from either the abstract logos of classical 
rhetoric and homiletics, or the street language of Socratic speech, as Alcibiades 
describes both the form and content, as well as effect, of Socratic teachings, in 
Plato’s Symposium.6 Rabbis frame their discussions on minor domestic, 
commercial and agrarian incidents unrelated to historical, political or 
theological issues, and seem to address topics of what in classical rhetoric 
would be categorized as the matter of farce, comedy and satire – bodily 
functions, child-rearing, spousal relationships, commercial arguments, farming 
practice, and so forth. The language moreover, though analogous to what is 
mocked in Socrates and other putative Cynical traditions, seems to be 
mundane, ordinary, and personal rather than ritualised, formal and hieratic or 
cultic. 
 
Simultaneity in Language 
Still another way to approach the specific language used to express rabbinic 
debates and arguments, both halachic and aggadic, is a figure is picked out for 
discussion by Robert Gordis. This rhetorical trope is called talhin, and like 
paronomasia it suggests that several meanings to a word, phrase or allusion are 
operative, but unlike word-play proper, it is not a conflation of sounds or 
appearances, even with intricate manipulation of “letters”. “In tilhin”, 
according to Gordis, one word conveys two levels of meaning simultaneously, 
one primary, the other secondary, and the reader’s recognition of both is the 
source of aesthetic pleasure”.7 This description is too cautious. The figure 
should be understood more dynamically and generously, so that it indicates in 
potential more than two simultaneous meanings, none of which may take 
precedence except as the reader shifts the perspective from which the 
exegetical process is manipulated, and the pleasure is often more than 
aesthetic, in that it may open up wonderful new insights into God’s plan, the 
merits or the demerits of the characters discussed, and the manner in which 
halachic law may be applied in diverse cases. Not even that expansion of the 
description of this rabbinic wit is enough. Talhin may signal an explosive 
                                                             
6 Plato, ‘Symposium’, trans. Benjamin Jowett, The Internet Classics Archive, at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/symposium.html, accessed 28/12/09. 
7 Robert Gordis, ‘Mythology, Folklore and Tradition: Studies in Yiddish Etymology’, in 
Fields of Offering: Studies in Honor of Raphael Patai, ed. Victor D. Sanua (Rutherford, 
Madison, Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press and London and Toronto: 
Associated University Presses, A Herzl Press Publication, 1983), p. 87. 
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intrusion by the rabbinical commentator, one that shatters at least for a moment 
the surface textures of syntax, logic and historical continuity in a narrative or 
the flow of logical argument, reassembles the particles of discourse, including 
the transformation of verbal and numerical equivalences (gematria), 
establishing new contexts in analogous passages elsewhere in the same book or 
some successor book. Such disruption, intrusion and reformulation may 
include the creation of characters, objects, places and actions by re-voicing of 
the Hebrew consonants, redistribution of the letters, reassembly of the words, 
and imposition of non-Hebraic word-play. But again, the key factor in these 
innovations is that no one reading replaces the other: all can be seen by shifting 
the perspective of the mental eye, as it were. 
 
Rhetoric and the Rabbis 
The shifting perspective which transforms the kind and function of images in 
the mental eye are best understood in a technical sense by discussion of 
classical rhetorical theories. Philosophically and theologically, of course, 
rabbis and classical writers have very different agenda, and their understanding 
of the function of these rhetorical tropes can at best be analogous within 
different contexts. Let us take a couple of examples of the rabbinical 
imagination before looking into these two rhetorical terms mentioned in the 
previous section. Gershom Scholem, discussing “The Crisis of Tradition in 
Jewish Messianism”,8 cites two passages where the crisis is encountered, 
challenged, and seemingly resolved.9 These form part of a series of mitzvoth 
that will not be continued in the future of messianic times, as Rashi comments 
on the reading of Numbers 7:11, “Today, to do them”, as explained in the 
Talmud at Avodah Zarah 31 and 4b. 
First, Scholem says, the Talmud cites a debate on the status of the Torah 
at the End of Days.10 He refers to Midrash Vayikra, Rabba IX:7 (which may be 
supplemented by several other rabbinical writings for what seems a 
                                                             
8 Gershom G. Scholem, ‘La crise de la tradition dans le messianisme juif’, in Le 
messianisme juif: Essais sur la spiritualité du judaïsme, ed. and trans. Bernard Dupuy 
(Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1974), pp. 103-138; originally The Messianic Idea in Judaism and 
Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality (New York: Schocken Books, 1974). This essay is also 
available, albeit without notes, online at The Greatest Service (3 September, 2007), 
http://cliffordshackforum.blogspot.com/2007/09/crisis-of-tradition-in-jewish.html, accessed 
28/12/09. 
9 For a more mystical discussion of the topic keyed to kabbalistic frames of reference, see 
Rav Pinchas Winston, ‘Parshas Mishpatim: Laying Down the Law Forever’, 
roshhashanah.torah.org (2005) at 
http://roshhashanah.torah.org/learning/perceptions/5765/mishpatim.html, accessed 28/12/09. 
10 Scholem, ‘La crise de la tradition’, pp. 110-111. 
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commonplace), “All sacrifices will be abolished except for the offering of 
thanksgiving”.11 “All prayers will be abolished except for the prayer of 
thanksgiving”. “All festivals will be abolished except for Purim, which will 
never be abolished”. Here the absolute closure to the old ways – which are the 
ways of our current status under the Law – seems to resolve with the 
abolishment of all sacrifices, prayers, or festivals except one, and this one both 
marks the beginning of a new time and continues the essence of all that has 
gone before. But then comes a voice of objection, dissension, and modification. 
Rabbi Eleazar intrudes into the debate, as found both in Yalkut and Midrash 
Mishlei where Proverbs 9:2 is in question, “Also the Day of Atonement [that is, 
Yom ha Kippurim] will never be abolished”. He adds to the list of what will 
continue and threatens the thrust of the radical transformation first announced. 
If there is one additional holiday not to be abolished, then why not another and 
another, until the original statement is watered down to meaninglessness? That 
breech, however, does not see a flood of other exceptions. The reason is that 
the addition is not so much a supplemental statement, a special pleading further 
exception to the rule of what will no longer exist in the Days of the Messiah, 
but something else. Scholem remarks that Rabbi Eleazar does not so much put 
forward a further example of festival that will survive the closure of past 
history. He makes a pun. “The pun”, Scholem says, “is both witty and 
dangerous, for it rests on the equivalent of sound present in both the name of 
the most holy and thoroughly ascetic holiday of the Jewish calendar, Yom 
Kippur, and Purim, a day of joy”.12 The pun seems simple enough; Yom ha-
Kippurim and Purim. 
The explanation given by the Israeli historian of mystical religions is 
that “a utopian element emerges here which splits apart the Day of Atonement 
and equates it with its opposite”. He adds casually at the close of this 
discussion, that although these changes are “witty and dangerous”, they are 
nevertheless “statements that are made almost in passing”. Let me unpack this 
complex statement and relate it to what has been said before. Two different 
kinds of Jewish holiday are juxtaposed, a similar sound noted in both, and they 
are thus made equivalent. The equivalence results in the splitting of the Day of 
Atonement, by a separation out of the two syllables of pur plus im (as though 
they were a meaningful body of meaning in themselves, instead of the im 
merely giving the plural ending to the word kippur). The two different kinds of 
holidays which began as opposites are transformed into a single equivalence, 
since the first, the Day of Atonement is a day of seriousness, fasting, and soul-
searching, whereas the second, Purim or The Festival of Esther or of Lots, is a 
                                                             
11 For kabbalistic texts, see Winston, ‘Parshas Mishpatim: Laying Down the Law Forever’. 
12 Scholem, ‘La crise de la tradition’, p. 110. 
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day of joy, feasting, and carnival revelry and drunkenness. The new holiday 
that is created by this splitting and reconstruction is one of supreme joy, 
heavenly celebration, and divine ecstasy. 
These three points are, I believe, what Gershom Scholem is getting at in 
his commentary. My own view is somewhat different. The two holidays, or 
rather, the two names of the holidays are more than juxtaposed, they are 
superimposed. The so-called pun fits the name of the second festival, Purim, 
into the longer name of the first, Yom ha-Kippurim. Purim is absorbed into the 
Day of Atonement. Or we might say instead: the word Purim emerges out of 
the name Yom ha-Kippurim. After hearing that the most joyful, post-biblical 
holiday, Purim, will be the one of all to be still celebrated at the End of Time, 
Rabbi Eleazar expands it to designate as well the most sacred and solemn of all 
Jewish holidays. In so doing, he transforms it, allowing the joy and ecstasy of 
Purim to flood into the fear and anticipation of Yom Kippur. The result is 
anything but equivalence. Both holidays are changed and merged into a new 
celebration that draws on the essential qualities of each, and both are taken out 
of their original contexts and placed together in a new matrix of relationships 
between earth and heaven, mankind and God. In other words, it is not a matter 
of splitting and then the juxtaposing of equivalence. There is the discovery of 
that which was hidden, silent and supposedly abolished in the second holiday 
name, Yom ha-Kippurim, the full name of which was condensed into the first, 
Purim. Rabbi Eleazar’s “adding” of a second festival to escape extinction is 
really the expansion of the first name, a revelation of what was previously 
unnoticed and unintended. 
Now Scholem makes his point reproducing the very rhetorical figure 
that he seems to downplay to the point of triviality or insignificance. How they 
can be “witty and dangerous” and also casual signals something more than he 
is able to deal with. In fact, when Scholem says that Rabbi Eleazar’s comments 
“are statements that are made almost in passing”, he himself makes this 
comment “almost in passing” as well. The revolutionary messianic innovation 
inherent in this pun on the two names of holidays, so important in later post-
Mishnah Jewish writing, appears first as a mere side comment, one left 
undeveloped by the original speakers and commentators. It would seem, 
ironically, the modern author treats this revolutionary transformation as an 
interesting but essentially naïve – innocent of theological intentions – 
consideration on the way to more important matters.  It is as though Rabbi 
Eleazar did not realize and perhaps could not realize what he was actually 
saying when he made his witty remark. Similarly, does Scholem know that he 
is operating within a particular rabbinical convention? He certainly does not 
seem to be aware, so that we will have to come back to this point when we deal 
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with the classical rhetorical figures so that the apparently casual and yet ill-
fitting phrase “witty and dangerous” takes on a more revealing significance. 
As soon as he has completed his discussion of the above example of 
how word play operates in rabbinic discourses, Scholem passes on to the next 
matter: 
Though still remaining in the purely speculative exegetical and 
literary realm, a remark concerning Psalm 146: 7 goes much further. 
It decisively removed the words “The Lord releases the prisoners” 
from the previous undialectical interpretation affording to which the 
tradition will be completely fulfilled in the Messianic age and, in 
most descriptions of it, shone forth with undiminished radiance.13 
Again we are, according to Scholem, dealing with rabbinical commentators – 
here it is a matter of Midrash Tehillim on Psalms 146:7 – who do not possess 
full awareness of the import or consequences of their remarks, although they 
do seem to be somewhat more advanced towards theological speculations into 
the nature of the messianic period as something that will do more than bring to 
completion and perfection programmes and principles already at work since 
the revelations of the mythical ancestors. Whatever the contextual concerns of 
the Psalmist in his own historical period, the rabbis now claim to discern a 
higher intention, which they can clarify by concentrating on the substance of 
the words themselves, rather than merely their overt sense. Here again is 
Scholem’s description of what happened: 
The Hebrew words of the Psalm lend themselves as well to a more 
daring but still faithful translation as: “The Lord dissolves the 
commandments” or “The Lord allows the forbidden” (mattir isurim 
instead of mattir asurim). What does this mean? Some say: ‘All 
animals which were forbidden [to be eaten] in this world God will 
one day again allow, as was the case until the time of Noah’. And 
why, in fact, has He forbidden them? In order to see who would 
accept His words and who would not. In the time to come, however, 
He will allow everything which He has forbidden.14 
The rabbis seem to be arguing over the problem of how to interpret the biblical 
injunction that would allow the eating of unclean animals at the End of Time 
when the Messiah has come, as though the regulations in the Torah were time-
bound to the world before sanctification, whereas they feel strongly that Torah 
is eternal and the Law is perfected not abrogated in the Days of the Messiah. 
This seems to lead to a division of the question into at least two parts. First, 
does the promise that forbidden foods will be permitted at the end of time 
mean that this dissolution of the regulation is a return to the status quo ante, 
                                                             
13 Scholem, ‘La crise de la tradition’, p. 111. 
14 Scholem, ‘La crise de la tradition’, p. 110. 
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before the Expulsion from the Garden of Eden, and hence a rectification of a 
temporary measure not a category shift completely on what is clean and what is 
impure, kosher and trayf? Or second, does it mean that there is indeed a more 
radical transformation of the world at the End of days which does more than 
sanctify and purify what was disturbed by the sinfulness of the original parents 
in Eden? A new beginning in new terms, so that the eating of what had been 
stipulated as unclean animals does not transgress the previous mitzvoth because 
these animals and the people allowed to eat them are transformed from what 
they were, both from what they had been as pre-lapsarian innocents in gan 
eden and as sinful creatures during the intervening period until the Days of the 
Messiah? Scholem argues that it is this second interpretation that radically 
alters Jewish messianic beliefs from traditional rectification to apocalyptic 
transformation. 
The interpretation in the midrash, however, is not discussed so much in 
speculative, dialectical, or philosophical terms, as in a witty re-reading of the 
primary text: the voicing of the Hebrew consonantal passage turns mattir 
isurim into mattir asurim. Changing the vowels to get isurim instead of asurim 
is indeed witty and dangerous, witty in the sense of a pun that merely 
substitutes one sound for another close to it, but dangerous because it suggests 
that conventional (pshat) readings of the text have hitherto been out of step 
with the original intentions of the writer of the text. 
 
Midrashic Imagination 
The midrashic imagination normally consists of four kinds of readings or 
interpretation beyond that of the simple miqra, that is, the sounding out of the 
consonants into traditional syllables, words, and phrases. For beginners, books 
contain vowel markings to guide such a preliminary reading. But interpretation 
proper carries forward through pshat, the conventional and normative reading 
that confirms current legal understandings of the Law or narrative event. This 
is anything but a literal level, as in Christian schemes of allegory, for it often 
involves elaborate substitutions of “what is spoken and understood” for “what 
is seen” on the page. Next comes ramez, the recontextualization of the word, 
phrase, or sentence under discussion, in order to interpret through analogies to 
passages in the same or similar books; the reader takes the “hint” from a shared 
sound, peculiarity of spelling or syntax, or occasionally detail of description or 
narration. Third is what is known as drash – although the whole process can 
also be termed a midrash – in the sense of a explanatory essay, narrative, riddle 
or other creative enhancement of the text in question. More specifically, this 
kind of interpretation begins to shatter the surface textures of the passage and 
reassemble letters, sounds, syntactic units and other elements of narration or 
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logical argumentation to generate a new version of the original, sometimes 
with new characters, objects, sequences of action, frames of reference, and 
moral principles. Finally there is the mode of interpretation named sod, the 
secret, which operates by finding new and unexpected aspects of the text 
hidden in the spelling, grammar and order of the words on the page, sometimes 
even in the formation and size of letters, layout in the manuscript pages, and 
other non-verbal or extra-literary aspects. The purpose here is less to recreate a 
different version of the original text by providing it with alternative letters, 
words, contexts, or contents; it is to reveal meanings supposedly already 
always there in the sacrality of the original script but requiring shifts in 
perspective to see. These four kinds of interpretation, pshat, remez, drash and 
sod, yield an angram, PaRaDeS, that is, Pardes or Paradise. They are also 
keyed to an aggadah about Four Men who entered paradise, each of whom has 
a different fate as a consequence, only Rabbi Akiva able to return safe and sane 
from his daring flight of interpretive fancy.15 The others either go mad, turn 
apostate or die. It is in the light of this symbolic anecdote that we should 
understand Scholem’s warning about the dangers of rabbinic wit in aggadic 
interpretation. It is also in this light that we can understand how the rabbis 
ventured to read their texts in processes that resemble, to a certain extent, what 
the rhetoricians called enargeia and fantasia. 
 
Enargeia and Fantasia: The Power of Classical Rhetoric 
Let me here quote from a study of rhetorical visualization in eighteenth-century 
poetry by James A. J. Wilson; 
The tradition begins with Aristotle, who states in his Rhetoric that 
“smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and 
expressions which set things before the eyes…things are set before 
the eyes by words that signify actuality”. Visualisable descriptions 
are also encouraged by the [pseudo-Ciceronian] Ad Herennium, the 
works of Cicero, and those of Quintilian. The Ad Herrenium defines 
the figures of Descriptio (vivid description) and Demonstratio 
(ocular demonstration), both of which are regarded as effective 
means for arousing the passions of indignation or pity, and directing 
these passions to fulfil specific aims. Quintilian defines enargaeia, 
which Cicero calls “illumination” or “actuality”, as that quality 
“which makes us not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual 
                                                             
15 Mortimer Ostow, ‘Four Entered the Garden: Normative Religion versus Illusion’, in 
Fantasy, Myth and Reality: Essays in Honour of Jacob A. Arlow, eds Harold P. Blum, Yale 
Kramer, Arlene K. Richards and Arnold D. Richards (New York: International Universities 
Press, 1988), pp. 287-301. 
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scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we 
were present at the actual occurrence.16 
The reason why I cite this passage in full is first of all because it shows that the 
ideas we are dealing with derive from all the main Greek and Roman rhetorical 
theorists and so constitute the heart and soul of classical ideas of how verbal 
language translates into mental images laden with potent emotional persuasion. 
Secondly, because it is assumed that the power of words is transformative and 
penetrative, that is, that they change from being sounds in a public oration or 
declamation, or graphic representations on the page, into sensory experiences 
that stimulate the mind to form mental pictures. In a sense, to take T.S. Eliot’s 
expression, objective correlatives of the emotions which the speaker initially 
experienced or wished to convey to his listeners in order to achieve the goals of 
rhetoric, namely, to move them to indignation, pity, or some other powerful 
feeling and associated action. More specifically, in regard to forensic or 
political persuasion, the speaker seeks to establish an ideological disposition in 
the audience to accept the experience of this orally induced truth in place of 
any prior memories, commonsense understanding or formal statements of what 
happened, what was seen, or what an event may have meant. This replacement 
or displacement of previously existing images, words, and emotions in the 
mind of the audience by those conveyed by the orator’s speech was also known 
as superstitio; a sense of having knowledge or experience of something 
otherwise either completely unknown or known in a different way with other 
kinds of meaning embedded in it. 
While enargeia can operate by energizing the words of the orator in 
such a way as to forcefully displace or replace prior knowledge and 
experiences and ways of understanding reality, the word itself derives from the 
root argo, light or illumination. Energia is an essentially different word, even 
though it is part of the total effect and purpose of the rhetorician’s endeavour. 
Hence Wilson speaks of “the pseudo-transfer of emotive reaction from 
persona/character to reader/watcher”. The process set out is a “pseudo-
transfer” to Wilson because, from his modern sceptical position, he does not 
believe there is a real transfer of emotive reaction, not an actual transformation 
of words into images and from images into an emotional belief in the reality of 
the received and constructed experience of reality. To a certain degree, the 
ancients shared this scepticism and knew they were speaking metaphorically of 
psychological phenomena they could not otherwise understand. Hence the 
                                                             
16 James A. J. Wilson, ‘Behold! The Rhetoric of Visualisation in Mid-Eighteenth-century 
Poetry’, Paper delivered to the British Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies Conference, 
2004, at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lady1262/BSECSpaper2004.html, accessed 28/12/09. 
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ambiguity inherent in the term they used to designate the transferred mental 
image: fantasia. 
In a legal argument, the lawyer for the defence attempts to persuade the 
jury that his version of what happened is the true one, so as to prove his client’s 
innocence of a crime charged against him. On the other side, the prosecuting 
attorney seeks to convince these fellow citizens that a crime took place, that the 
accused committed the act, and that consequently a verdict of guilty is required 
to satisfy the law and protect the state. In effect, each of these specialists in 
forensic oratory seek to create a more powerful speech than the other and thus 
to establish in the jury’s collective mind a clear representation of what 
happened. This can be seen dramatically and fictionally in Shakespeare’s 
Othello where Iago persuades the Moorish general that Desdemona is guilty of 
adultery by preparing him to accept as ocular proof what is only a neutral piece 
of circumstantial evidence, her handkerchief. Iago’s words illuminate Othello’s 
mind with suspicions, confusions, and probabilities that sight of the 
handkerchief transfers into the hero’s mind a powerful scene of illicit 
lovemaking between his wife and Cassio. All of the Moor’s past knowledge of 
Desdemona, albeit brief, and his trust based on their intense love, all of that is 
replaced by a conviction of her guilt in a crime he fears so much that he cannot 
approach it with common sense or rational questioning. 
 
Conclusion 
With rabbis there is little in the way of visualization of this sort in regard to 
people, things, events and ideas. Marc Bregman has discussed a few instances 
where the midrashim attempt to argue for changes in the way texts mean by 
supplementing the normal word-play in exegesis with focus on the process of 
seeing itself, in at least two senses.17 Firstly, how characters look, recognize 
and act on what they see, as in the case of the Akedah, the Binding of Isaac, 
where the approach to Mount Moriah where the sacrifice is to take place is 
visualized in terms of simultaneous perceptions of performance of the cult 
sacrifices in the Temple on Mount Zion. The consolidation of these two kinds 
of action embodied in the emergence of the term ‘to see’, reah, in the name of 
the place, Moreah, by which means ‘seeing’ becomes a form of 
                                                             
17 Marc Bregman, ‘Aqedah: Midrash as Visualization’, The Journal of Textual Reasoning, 
vol. 10 (2001), at http://etext.virginia.edu/journals/tr/archive/volume10/Bregman.html, 
accessed 28/12/09. Also worthy of note are the commentaries on this essay in the same 
volume of this journal by Zacheray Braiterman and Daniel N. Conway. See also Marc 
Bregman, ‘Isaak Heinemann’s Classic Study of Aggadah and Midrash’, Department of 
Religious Studies, University of North Carolina at Greenboro (19 March, 2008), at 
http://www.uncg.edu/rel/contacts/faculty/Heinemann, accessed 28/10/10. 
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sacramentalization and participation in the sacrifice of Isaac which remains 
incomplete. Secondly, how things or actions are seen by those outside of the 
formal scene itself, when, for instance, an event is recontextualized into 
another environment, such as when the Song of Songs is imagined to be sung 
either at the time of the giving of the law at Mount Sinai or of the crossing 
through the Red Sea by the Children of Israel. In each instance the imagery of 
the erotic lyrics become substantiated when seen as details within historical (or 
mythical) actions. 
As José Faur and others have shown in the last twenty-odd years, the 
rabbis were already always engaged in the kind of creative speculations 
(sometimes to quite fantastic degrees) that we are familiar with as markers of 
late modern and post-modern literature. Franz Kafka, Albert Cohen and Elias 
Canetti engage in these kinds of witty textual practices. Rather than dismissing 
midrashim and aggadot as the peculiar, if not mad or demented, actions of an 
intellectual elite cut off from the mainstream of Western intellectual tradition, 
we would be better advised to take them as central components of our 
civilization, and enjoy – to the extent of moral learning and psychological 
enrichment – their exegetical games. 
 
 
 
